Bridging nuclear safety, security and safeguards at geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel by Niemeyer, Irmgard et al.
Session 3d– HLW  IAEA-CN-242 
20 
03d – 04 / ID 172. Disposal of High Level Waste 
BRIDGING NUCLEAR SAFETY, SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS AT GEOLOGICAL 
DISPOSAL OF HIGH LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT NUCLEAR 
FUEL 
I. Niemeyer, G. Deissmann, D. Bosbach 
Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, IEK-6: Nuclear Waste Management and Reactor Safety  
E-mail contact of main author: i.niemeyer@fz-juelich.de  
Abstract. In order to consider geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel in all 
its complexity, related nuclear safety, security and safeguards issues have to be taken into account. By 
identifying both synergies in overlapping methods or techniques and differences in the requirements with 
respect to safety, security and safeguards, advantage of inherent synergies and conflicting requirements can be 
taken at the same time. While there is a general understanding of the potential benefits of the 3S concept, neither 
the interfaces and synergies between safety, security and safeguards nor their practical implementation are yet 
fully understood. This paper discusses the role and importance of safety, security and safeguards regarding the 
geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent fuel. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of the terms ‘nuclear safety’, ‘nuclear security’ and ‘nuclear safeguards’ is often not 
sharply delimited from each other, though definitions for each of these issues exist. 
According to IAEA definitions, ‘nuclear safety’ refers to “[t]he achievement of proper 
operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, 
resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation 
hazards” [1], and therefore stands for the safe operation of nuclear installations. 
‘Nuclear security’ implies “[t]he prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, 
sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear 
material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities” [1] and is aimed at the 
physical protection of nuclear installations. 
‘Nuclear safeguards’ are “designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, 
services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request 
or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military 
purpose” [2] or, in short, to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear material. 
The interaction or intersections of the three components depend on the context, and the 
significance of each of the components may vary for different types of nuclear installations.  
In order to consider geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel 
in its full complexity, all related nuclear safety, security and safeguards issues must be taken 
into account. While safety can benefit from some provisions regarding safeguards and 
physical protection (security), it may also be contravened by others. Some techniques for 
monitoring geological repositories, such as environmental sampling, could provide relevant 
data for safety, security and safeguards. Other techniques, such as geophysical measurements 
for safeguards verification, are to be implemented in a way that does not infringe long-term 
safety requirements. Therefore, identifying both synergies in overlapping methods or 
Session 3c – ILW  IAEA-CN-242 
21 
techniques or with respect to their future development as well as differences in the 
requirements with respect to safety, security and safeguards may help to take advantage of 
inherent synergies and conflicting requirements at the same time.  
The need of integrating the three ‘S’s’, also referred to as the ‘3S concept’, to the extent 
possible throughout all the stages of the nuclear installations’ life cycle, was recognized by 
the IAEA in 2008 [3,4] and at the same time, the G8 countries declared to support the 3S 
concept [5,6] . Since then, a number of papers discussed the benefits of considering a 3S 
approach [e.g., 7-9] in designing and operating nuclear facilities, but only a few addressed the 
issue of applying 3S to geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear 
fuel [10-12].  
While there is a general understanding of the potential benefits of the 3S concept, neither the 
interfaces and synergies between safety, security and safeguards nor their practical 
implementation are fully understood to date. This also applies to the geological disposal of 
high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Numerous legislations, regulations and 
other documents have emphasized that safety is the primary requisite in all life cycle stages 
of geological repositories. But what is the significance of security and safeguards with respect 
to geological disposal?  
2. Role and importance of safety, security and safeguards regarding the geological 
disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel 
2.1.Legal and organizational framework 
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards legislations are laid down in a series of national and 
international agreements, conventions and regulations [13]. With reference to the 3S concept, 
the IAEA noted the need for nuclear legislation that reflects the interrelations between safety, 
security and safeguards in a comprehensive and synergetic manner [14]. Accordingly, any 
new or revised nuclear legislation on geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and 
spent nuclear fuel should also take 3S conflicts and interfaces into account. 
Safety and security are mainly based on an appropriate national legal and organizational 
framework, including national regulatory oversight of safety and national law enforcement in 
case of security threats. Safeguards, however, represents an international legal commitment, 
determined by safeguards agreements and additional protocols between States and the IAEA 
[15]. States under safeguards verification by the IAEA usually have a national or regional 
Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA) in place that acts as interface between the State and 
the IAEA. Some States, such as Finland and Japan, have established national regulatory 
bodies that cover safety, security and safeguards issues of their nuclear installations and 
programmes, including geological disposal, in a single organization [10]. 
2.2.Material concerned  
Safe geological disposal requires a stable geological formation to provide for the long term 
containment of radionuclides and their isolation from the biosphere. Safety therefore 
addresses all types of radionuclides, in particular the long-lived ones (with half-life periods in 
the order of up to 10
7
 years), i.e. actinides and long-lived fission and activation products. 
Security considers nuclear material and other radioactive material [1], and safeguards are 
principally applied to all source (uranium, thorium) or special fissionable material containing 
uranium or plutonium [2]. The lowest common denominator of a 3S control of nuclear 
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material in high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel would therefore include uranium, 
plutonium and thorium. 
2.3.Timelines  
The safety case and safety assessment for geological disposal facilities consider the three life 
cycle stages, i.e. the pre-operational period, the operational period and the post-closure 
period, spanning over periods in the order of thousands of years and potentially longer (i.e. up 
to hundreds of thousands of years) [16]. Security measures do address the three life cycle 
stages as well, with a focus on the pre-operational and operational periods, although a 
generally care and maintenance free post-closure phase is stipulated in the regulations in 
various countries. The timeline for safeguards activities is bound by the duration of the 
safeguards agreements and, in the end, will be applied as long as the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains in force.  
A 3S assessment should thus be based on the longest timeline of the single ‘S’-components, 
while the role and importance of each of the three ‘S’s’ would vary or decrease over time. If a 
‘3S case’ was to be prepared instead of the safety (1S) case, the long-term post-closure period 
would mainly be assessed from the safety perspective. 
2.4.Control measures 
Safety, security and safeguards activities include similar or complementary measures for 
documenting, measuring and monitoring the inventory of radionuclides, in particular with 
regard to uranium, plutonium and thorium. In order to avoid redundancy or duplication of 
work and equipment, a material control and accountancy system should include practices and 
procedures, as well as techniques for measurement, sealing and surveillance that fulfil the 
requirements as to safety, security and safeguards to the extent possible.  
2.5.Facility design 
The IAEA generally considers safety, security and safeguards as essential elements in all life 
cycle stages of nuclear facilities. In this context, the IAEA has issued a guidance document 
[17] aimed at informing stakeholders how to design facilities for nuclear waste management 
by early consideration of safeguards in the planning stage so that provisions can be better 
integrated with other design requirements as to safety and security.  
This approach, also referred to as ‘safeguards by design’ (SBD) should be more closely 
interlocked with the 3S concept. ‘Safety, security, safeguards by design’ (3SBD), as generally 
proposed by [18,19], can help to reduce efforts and costs related to nuclear waste 
management and disposal. 
3. Findings 
Safety, security and safeguards aspects regarding the geological disposal of high-level 
radioactive waste and spent fuel should be addressed and managed in a coordinated, 
complementary approach. Further R&D will be needed to identify methods and technologies 
(a ‘3S toolbox’) that would be best suited for the holistic consideration of safety, security and 
safeguards provisions. By early consideration of conflicting requirements as to safety, 
security and safeguards, their impacts on all three life cycle stages of geological disposal can 
be minimized. The 3SBD toolbox should include methods and technologies for material 
accountancy, nuclear measurements, containment and surveillance, environmental 
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monitoring, continuity of knowledge, as well as design implications to the benefit of all 
safety, security and safeguards at geological disposal. 
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